Marion "Hack" Mixson

After a trial nighttime flight to the east of Berlin on March 21 to measure the state of Soviet air defense, the first overflight mission was approved and briefed. On the night and early morning of April 17-18, 1952, in absolute radio silence, three RB-45Cs repainted in RAF colors took off from Sculthorpe, were air-refueled, and entered the Soviet Union simultaneously at three different locations in the northern, central and southern areas of the Western USSR. Flying at about 35,000 feet, the planes proceeded on separate tracks. As each RB-45C crossed the border into the Baltic states in the north, Belorussia in the center, and the Ukraine in the south (the mission Crampton and Sanders flew) the Soviet air defense system sprang into action, and Allied intelligence listened in. For all of the fighters that scrambled into the night sky, however, none found the British in the dark, and they all returned safely to base.

The information they brought back was crucial. All three missions photographed and collected radar images of Soviet Long-Range Aviation (LRA) as well as nearby air defense bases. These would be bases which would need to be destroyed first at the onset of any US/USSR conflict. In the event of war - which in the 1950s seemed likely - SAC had to destroy the USSR's Long Range Air Force at the outset to prevent it from striking targets in Western Europe and the United States.

The "Special Duty Flight" disbanded shortly thereafter. But in October it was reformed at Sculthorpe. Training for a second mission began. But in early December the impending mission was cancelled. For Churchill, the risking of his political future in one covert overflight had perhaps proved enough. On December 18, 1952, John Crampton and Hack Mixon led the Special Duty Flight of four RB-45Cs back across the Atlantic Ocean, landing at Lockbourne AFB in Ohio as snow was falling. Through the gloom, base maintenance personnel who approached the aircraft stared in disbelief at the US Air Force bombers still decked out in British livery.

Extracts from the book "I Always Wanted to Fly", by Colonel Wolfgang WE Samuel. ISBN 1-57806-399-X.

Colonel Marion C Mixson:

With the impetus of the Korean War, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and US President Harry S Truman agreed to a combined aerial reconnaissance program for flights over the western Soviet Union. At the time, the only aircraft able to implement such a program was the RB-45C Tornado. RAF Sculthorpe, hidden away among the hedgerows of rural and remote East Anglia, was home to B-45A Tornado bombers of the 47th Bombardment Wing. The reconnaissance version of the B-45 was assigned to SAC. Although there were organizational differences between the bomber and reconnaissance units, having the same aircraft type at one air base simplified maintenance and support functions. In all other respects, the three squadrons of B-45A bombers and the one rotational squadron of RB-45C reconnaissance aircraft remained separate.

"Soon after I checked out on the RB-45 at Barksdale, I was sent in May 1951 to RAF Sculthorpe. Our presence at Sculthorpe consisted of the twelve aircraft of the 323d SRS, which I con\mmanded. By the time I arrived at Sculthorpe, RAF air crews had already joined the squadron and flown one or two joint missions. By the end of July, I returned to the United States, accompanied by three RAF air crews to continue their training at Barksdale AFB. We had landed at Barksdale in a KB-29 about nine o'clock in the evening. The Brits wore their heavy RAF winter uniforms. When we left England early in the morning it was chilly. When we landed at Barksdale at nine o'clock in the evening it was ninety degrees, the humidity was 99 percent, and a thunderstorm and a tornado had just come across the end of the field. The RAF flyers soon got used to their new Louisiana environment and quickly made friends and acquaintances among the American air crews.

Captain Howard "Sam" Myers, the Berlin Airlift veteran, was assigned to the 322d squadron at Barksdale. Sam had his first flight in the RB-45C in May 1951. By July, Sam recalled meeting RAF air crews both in the officers club and on the flight line. He thought they were there to learn how to fly the RB-45 in case they acquired some for the RAF. He quickly struck up a casual friendship with a couple of the RAF pilots and navigators, but by August, the RAF flyers vanished. "I moved them up to Lockbourne AFB in Ohio, the new location of the 91st SRW," recalled Hack Mixson, "when my squadron, the 323d, moved there. A major part of their training took place at Lockbourne and was conducted among the three squadrons - the 322d, the 323d, and the 324th. The Brits cracked up one aicraft - didn't hurt anyone but uined the airplane. That crew washed out of the program and was replaced by another."

In September 1951 Sam Myers transferred with the rest of his squadron from Barksdale to Lockbourne and again ran into his RAF friends. In November, Sam was on his way to England as the 322d squadron replaced the 323d. He flew his RB-45C via the usual northern route to RAF Sculthorpe for a three month TDY assignment. Soon after his arrival at Sculthorpe in December, Sam again encountered his RAF colleagues, who had returned after completing their RB-45 training at Lockbourne. "During my stay at Sculthorpe," Sam recalled, "I had an RAF copilot and RAF radar navigator on many occasions. They stayed current in the aircraft by flying with us. We flew mostly along the periphery of the Soviet Union, but occasionally we flew over Soviet satelite countries. Cooperation between us and the RAF was excellent. They were great flyers."

Hack Mixson explained that "we rotated the three 91st Wing squadrons into Sculthorpe. Because of my experience with the RAF crews and as the only one knowledgeable of the real purpose of their being there, I remained behind in England when my squadron rotated home. All in all, I got to do about four three-month TDYs over there."

Meanwhile, plans were made for the first deep penetration of the Soviet Union. Four RB-45s at Sculthorpe were stripped of their US Air Force markings and repainted with Royal Air Force roundels on the fuselage and RAF colors on the tail fin. Aircraft numbers were omitted. On March 21, 1952, a night mission was flown into East Germany, east of Berlin, to find out how the Soviets would react to such an incursion. Their reaction wasn't sufficient to dissuade the planners from going ahead with the overflight they had planned for the night of April 17, 1952. In a 1998 letter to the Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Squadron Leader John Crampton recalled, "Even though the story leaked out of the woodwork two or three years ago, I still find it strange to talk or write about it. While it was happening it rivalled the Manhattan Project for secrecy. In fact, I think it outranked the Manhattan Project. While off base we weren't allowed to THINK about it. It was all well above top secret. It was at Sculthorpe that Hal Connor, the tough little Texan who commanded the squadron, selected four of his airplanes (one was a spare) for our operational use." Hal Connow was the commander of the 322d squadron, to which Sam Myers was assigned and which pulled a rotational tour of duty at Sculthorpe. Connor, however, was not aware of what the RAF was up to; Hack Mixson and a handful of highly placed military and political officials were the only Americans who knew that.

On the night of April 17, 1952, three RB-45Cs in RAF colors rose into the East Anglia sky and proceeded to the individual air-refueling areas - one over the North Sea; another over Copenhagen, Denmark; and a third south of Frankfurt, Germany. The three aircraft topped off their fuel tanks from US Air Force B-29 refueling tankers and proceeded on their individual routes, flying at thirty-five thousand feet in total radio silence into the heart of the Soviet Union. One plane photographed targets in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; in Poland; and in the former German province of East Prussia. The second aircraft flew across Belorussia as far as Orel. The third plane was piloted by Sqadron Leader Crampton, with Sanders as his radar navigator. This craft flew the longest and most southern route, crossing the Ukraine and penetrating as far as Rostov on the Black Sea. Each route had frequent turning points to include a maximum number of potential targets.

A month after the RAF flew its deep-penetration mission into the Soviet Union, Sam Myers prepared to return to the United States. "I went out to the flight line to preflight my aircraft for the return trip. I distinctly rembered a logo painted on the nose of the aircraft - it was gone. And there was the slightest hint of an RAF roundel on the fuselage. It was clearly one of the aircraft used by the RAF for its overflights, but at the time, I could only guess."

In October, 1952, Hack Mixson was alerted for another possible RAF mission planned for late December. "Four aircraft were repainted at RAF Sculthorpe in RAF colors," Hack recalled, "but at the last minute the mission was cancelled. It was December 18, 1952, just before Christmas and everyone wanted to get home. I called Headquarters Strategic Air Command in Omaha, and they decided to have us fly the sirplanes home without first repainting them. While there were four airplanes, the RAF only had three full crews to fly them. They were short a pilot for the fourth crew. So I flew one of them back with a British engineer in the copilot's seat and Rex Sanders as my radar navigator. It was a long and tiring ten-hour flight, since the engineer couldn't help me fly the plane. Snow was blowing at Lockbourne when we arrived. There were some surprised looks by the ground crew when we taxied in, resplendent in the colors of the Royal Air Force. In January 1953 SAC began transferring our RB-45s to the Tactical Air Command, and I left Lockbourne temporarily to get checked out on the new six-jet B-47.

"Between January and March 1953 I checked out in the B-47 at McCoy AFB near Orlando, Florida, along with Hal Austin and many others who once flew the RB-45C. Late in the year, one we got operational in the RB-47, the 91st Wing deployed to Nousseur Air Base in Morocco, North Africa. While at Nouasseur I got a message to see General LeMay at Offutt - immediately. I caught a ride on a plane and headed back to Nebraska. Once I got to Offutt, Lemay told me to get fown to Shaw AFB in South Carolina; pick up four RB-45s; take them to Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio, for modifications to their radars; and then fly them over to Sculthorpe. TAC crews flew the airplanes to Wright-Patterson. The modifications to the radar took about a month. The radar fix was implemented under the supervision of English radar experts, who significantly improved the picture to very crisp and clear. When the aircraft arrived in Sculthorpe in early April 1954, Crampton and his bunch were waiting for the airplanes. They were repainted in RAF colors, and we waited for the launch date on routes nearly identical to those flown in 1952. The date of the mission was April 28, 1954, ten days past the two-year anniversary of the 1952 flight."

Again Squadron Leader Crampton took the longest, most southern route, extended as far as Volgograd, the former Stalingrad. In his letter Crampton wrote of this mission: The RB-45C squadrons who were our kind and courteous hosts during that very dicey period from which I have always thought we were very lucky indeed to survive, especially now that we know that the Russians knew we were to fly the second mission in 1954, and shot at us all 'round our route - and frightened the life out of me over Kiev when they finally got our height right and sent up a highway of predicted flak, a real highway, fantastic it was, but by the grace of God they got our speed wrong and checked the stuff just ahead of us. Even the hot shards of shrapnel missed us." Although all three RB-45s returned safely, it was a close thing. It was the last flight in the RB-45C for the RAF. Crampton found the operation "a good example of real USAF/RAF get-togetherness. There was never anything quite like it!"

However discouraging the outcome of the Canberra’s daytime flight to Kapustin Yar, the British and Americans soon agreed on another group of nighttime strategic reconnaissance overflights of the western USSR. By this time the USAF had transferred its RB-45Cs from SAC to the Tactical Air Command [TAC], and General LeMay no longer played a direct role in the missions. At Sculthorpe RAFB, the RAF’s Special Duty Flight reformed with most of the same crews from the 1952 overflight missions; they were once again led by Squadron Leader John Crampton and Squadron Leader Rex Sanders. RAF Bomber Command’s chief scientist, "Lew" Llewelyn, worked to improve the pictures produced by the cameras that filmed images on the radar scopes. In late April, the RAF aircrews learned that the mission plan was virtually identical to the one flown in 1952, except that the third aircraft would make a deeper penetration of southern USSR.

The Special Duty Flight executed the mission on the night of April 28 - 29, 1954; The primary targets again involved bases of the Soviet Long Range Air Force. The RB-45Cs again were repainted in RAF colors, and Crampton and Sanders again took the southern run, but it did not go so easily for them this time. As their airplane approached Kiev - and while Sanders tended the radar — Crampton was startled to see a highway of bursting flak about 200 yards before him at exactly his own altitude, 36,000 feet. Briefed to return if the security of the flight were compromised, he hauled the airplane around on its starboard wing tip, until its gyro compass pointed west, and descended to 34,000 feet to avoid the flak, which was set to explode at a fixed altitude. He cut short the mission. Nonetheless, the return track took the aircraft close to many of the remaining targets, which Sanders photographed as they passed. When the RB-45C met up with its tanker over West Germany, the refueling boom refused to stay in the aircraft receptacle. Fearing that it might have been damaged by the flak over Kiev, Crampton landed near Munich to refuel. Meanwhile the other two flights flew their routes without misadventure, though numerous fighters were sent up after them. A few weeks later, in early May, the RAF Special Duty Flight disbanded for the last time.

Shadow Flights by Curtis Peebles Hardcover - 368 pages 1 edition (November 1, 2000) Presidio Pr; ISBN: 0891417001 $27.95

The RAF Special-Duty Flight: RB-45Cs Over the USSR

In early 1951, Gen. Hoyt S Vandenberg, the air force chief of staff, offered the loan of four RB-45Cs (three mission aircraft and one spare) to the RAF. They would make simultaneous night overflights of the western USSR to obtain radarscope photographs of target areas.

In the event of war, SAC and the RAF's Bomber Command would attack at night or in bad weather - using radar to navigate and hit their targets - to minimize losses. Aerial photos would be used to create ìsynthetic radar predictions of how target areas would appear on the radarscopes. Because the GX photos were seven to eight years old, the predictions might not be valid. What was needed were up-to-date radarscope photos of long-range air force bases, industrial and military facilities, and Soviet cities.

Air chief marshal Sir Ralph Cochrane, the vice chief of air staff, was given operational responsibility for the overflights. In June 1951, he asked squadron leader HB "Micky" Martin, who had flown during World War II with the No. 617 Squadron (better known as the Dambusters), to set up and lead a ìspecial duty flight. Martin was apparently told only that they would be doing some special flying. In turn, Martin saw Rex Sanders, then a flight lieutenant at the Air Ministry who was responsible for navigator training. Martin asked Sanders, who had flown thirty-three bombing missions over Europe in World War II, to recommend a good navigator. Sanders realized that whatever he would be doing, it would be interesting, so he said, "Well, I nominate myself." Martin accepted his offer.

On July 12, 1951, Martin and Sanders went to RAF Sculthorpe to look over the US Air Force RB-45Cs that had been assigned to the base a few months before. These were brand-new aircraft. The first flight of an RB-45C had been made only in April 1950, and the first had been delivered to the air force in June 1950.

As these events were unfolding, the full complement for the RAF overflights was assembled. Each RB-45C required a crew of three: the pilot, copilot, and navigator. In addition to the nine crewmen, a doctor was assigned to the special-duty flight. They were not volunteers (other than Sanders) but rather had been assigned to the unit. Because the crewmen would be flying the RB-45C at altitudes in excess of 40,000 feet, they underwent special medical exams. During the tests, squadron leader Martin was found to have a lung condition that prevented him from flying the mission. A new commander was needed.

In July 1951, squadron leader John Crampton was ordered by the commander in chief of Bomber Command to take charge of the special-duty flight and prepare to head for the United States for conversion training. Crampton had flown Whitley and Halifax bombers during World War II, then Meteor and Vampire jet fighters after the war. Crampton had a reputation for an upright manner and for the way he drove his Maserati.

Crampton and the other crewmen left RAF Sculthorpe aboard a C-97 Stratofreighter on August 3, 1951, heading for Barksdale Air Force Base. Here they spent ten days with a B-45 squadron to become familiar with the aircraft, then were flown to Langley Air Force Base, where they were introduced to the RB-45C version. On September 2, they went to Lockbourne Air Force Base, the home of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS), and began a short but complete RB-45C conversion course. During the training, one of the RAF pilots made a heavy night landing, which damaged the RB-45C beyond repair. The pilot and other crewmen were not hurt.

As a result of the accident, the base commander, Crampton, and the RAF pilot were flown to SAC headquarters to be interviewed by Gen. Curtis LeMay. Crampton recalled later that General LeMay "did not like people who broke his aircraft, and left us in no doubt of the fact." General LeMay's anger was directed primarily at the RAF pilot, who was soon sent home. Crampton later learned that the pilot had a reputation at his previous unit of being a "pranger" (RAF slang for a pilot who made hard landings), and his assignment to the special-duty flight had been to get rid of him. His replacement was an RAF pilot who was already on an exchange tour with an air force B-45 squadron.

Although the members of the special-duty flight were undergoing training, senior RAF and US Air Force officials were not sure of their future. A letter from air chief marshal Cochrane to Gen. Nathan L Twining expressed concern that Atlee would not give his approval. Cochrane said, "We have not yet obtained the political agreement which will be necessary if the full project is to be undertaken." Within the air force, only Vandenberg, Twining, LeMay, and Gen. Thomas D White knew about the plan. This caused some problems, however. Only thirty-three RB-45Cs had been built, and they were in heavy demand. Major General Roger M Ramey, air staff director of operations, objected to loaning the aircraft to the British. General Twining had to smooth things over. British participation in the joint overflight program was increasingly important, because the early American plans were running into trouble.

At the same time, the fortunes of the special-duty flight were beginning to change. In October 1951, the British electorate gave a parliamentary majority to the Conservative Party, resulting in Winston S Churchill becoming prime minister. As England's wartime leader, Churchill was deeply involved with intelligence operations. He understood their importance and their risks.

The special-duty flight completed the training by early December 1951 and was assigned to RAF Sculthorpe as an additional flight with the US RB-45C squadron based there. The nine RAF crewmen, Crampton recalled, "raised eyebrows, which we were unable to lower." This eased when Lt. Col. Marion C "Hack" Mixson was assigned as their liaison officer and handled many of the questions. The RAF crewmen still had no idea of what they were doing. Crampton recalled that he thought the project was to evaluate the air force "flying boom" refueling system against the RAF's probe and drogue. Flight sargent Bob Anstee thought the project was an assessment of the RB-45C for possible RAF use. They were now flying practice missions over England and Western Europe with the RB-45Cs. These were both day and night missions, with mixed RAF and US Air Force crews, and used cameras and the radarscopes.

Early in 1952, Crampton and Sanders were ordered to Bomber Command headquarters at High Wycombe for their briefing on the overflights. Crampton confessed to "some apprehension" when the charts were unrolled. The three separate routes went from Sculthorpe to the Baltic States, the Moscow area, and central southern USSR. The three missions would take off in rapid succession, then refuel from tankers to the north of Denmark. The RB-45Cs would climb at maximum continuous power, at about Mach 0.68, to the highest altitude that the temperature of the night would permit. They would cover targets throughout the western USSR. Timing was critical, they were told, because ground signal intelligence (SIGINT) stations would be listening for the Soviet response to the deep penetrations, and there were certain diversionary exercises planned to keep the Soviets clear of the routes. If the RB-45Cs were attacked, the crews would use an emergency OMG (O My God) radio frequency to report the situation.

Crampton was relieved to finally know what they would be doing, but he was concerned about how to break the news to the other crewmen. His concerns were soon justified. Anstee was shocked when he learned of the mission. "Oh my God, what have they let us in for?" Anstee said. "Why? Why us? Why did we get lumbered with it?" One of the other pilots refused to fly the mission and returned to his original unit. Crampton was afraid that "he might well entertain his chums" with this "extraordinary tale," thus compromising the mission's security. As with the pilot who washed out of training, he was replaced with another RAF pilot who was flying an exchange tour with a B-45 squadron in the United States.

Before the deep overflights were made, a test mission was flown by Crampton's crew on the night of March 21, 1952. This was a half-hour flight through the Berlin corridor at high altitude, to determine the Soviet's reaction. The SIGINT ground stations monitored radio and radar activities, but nothing was noted, and final preparations were started for the overflights.

The three primary aircraft and the spare were to be stripped of all US Air Force markings and repainted with RAF roundels. Crampton assumed that if one of the RB-45Cs was lost, the United States could point to the markings and disavow any knowledge of the airplane; the RAF could say that it did not have any RB-45Cs in service. Crampton's security worries were increased by the ploy, however. To get the airplanes ready in time, two had to be sent to nearby RAF West Raynham. A hangar was cleared out, and several mystified airmen used gallons of paint stripper to remove the markings.

The missions were scheduled for the night of April 17th and 18th, 1952. As "cover," each of the three crews had to endure no less than three preflight briefings: the real one for the overflights, another for their Sculthorpe cover story, and a third that they would give to Soviet interrogators should they be shot down. If captured, the crews were to say that they had been on a weather flight. For the southern route it was over the Black Sea; for the two northern routes it was the Gulf of Bothnia. Each plane had a complete set of false maps and plots to back up the cover story. Crampton later called the cover story "a gross professional insult to my crew and myself, but an acceptable one if dire need arose." Anstee wondered how well this would work if the Soviets found the equipment aboard the aircraft.

In late afternoon, the three RAF RB-45Cs took off and headed east toward their tankers. All three airplanes were successfully refueled, taking every pound that the tanks could carry. The three crews doused their airplanes lights and, now hidden by the night, turned toward their courses over the USSR. Crampton had selected the longest route, across the southern USSR, for himself. As they flew along, everything was going well. Sanders reported that he was getting good radar plots, and he periodically requested course changes to the next target. The copilot, Sgt. Bill Lindsay, reported that the aircraft systems were working normally and, most important, they were on the right side of the fuel consumption curve. The middle route, near Moscow, was flown by the crew of flight lieutenant Gordon Cremer, flight sargent Bob Anstee, and Sgt. Don Greenslade. The northern route, over the Baltic States, was flown by the crew of flight lieutenants Bill Blair and John Hill and flight sargent Joe Acklam.

Crampton's most significant memory of the flight was the "apparent wilderness" over which they were flying. There were no lights on the ground or any signs of human habitation. Anstee recalled that there were many lights visible on the ground as they left Copenhagen after refueling, but over the USSR it was "one large black hole with odd lights here and there." This changed as they approached Moscow. Anstee continued: "When you do see lights they really stand out. . . . once we came up south of Moscow itself you could see all the lights. Moscow's a big place and lit up so you do get a good reference point from that."

Crampton and his crew continued their flight across the southern USSR. The RB-45C maintained a slow climb at about Mach 0.68 to 36,000 feet, following the briefed route and covering the targets. There was no visible reaction from Soviet air defenses. Crampton said later: "It was all so quiet as to be distinctly eerie." Finally, the three aircraft made the turn for home, covering more targets before reaching friendly airspace. Due to the length of their flight, Crampton had to refuel from a tanker a second time before flying back to Sculthorpe.

The only real problem with the overflights was the weather back in England. About twenty minutes before the first aircraft, flown by flight lieutenant Blair over the Baltic States, was due to arrive, clouds rolled in from the North Sea and the aircraft had to divert to RAF Marston. Crampton was able to land at Sculthorpe during a break in the fog, after ten hours and twenty minutes in the air. The third RB-45C, flown by flight lieutenant Cremer, had to make a precautionary landing in Copenhagen due to engine trouble caused by icing up of the fuel filters. The crew took off again and landed at Prestwick.

After Crampton completed the overflights in April 1952, he was given command of No. 101 Squadron, which had recently been reequipped with the RAFís first Canberra light jet bombers. Although Crampton was pleased to be given such a choice assignment, he found that the pilot's seat of the Canberra seemed small after having flown the RB-45C - "not unlike a Ford Escort after a stretched Cadillac," he said.

While Crampton was trying to settle in, a second series of RB-45C overflights was being proposed. Sir John Slessor, chief of the air staff, suggested to General Vandenberg a joint US Air Force and RAF effort code-named Ju Jitsu. Slessor's September 12, 1952, letter read: "I gathered from Nate [Twining] that the President's reactions were "Why don't you do more of it"? On that, I suggested to Nate that we might each find three crews and do six sorties simultaneously in November. . . . I think it would be a great help in getting the Old Man's [Churchill] approval to do another Ju Jitsu if we could say that the US as well as British crews would take part."

The SAC London headquarters backed Slessor's proposed joint operation and also warned of the problems that not having US participation might cause. It reported to General Twining: "Firstly, one of the races scheduled will be over a course in which we have a primary interest and second, it is entirely possible that without our participation the Betting Commissioner [Churchill] here may reject Sir John's application." United States participation proved impossible, and on September 18, General Vandenberg replied to Slessor: "I agree with you it would be desirable for participation by aircrews of the USAF in the operation for the reasons you have stated. However, I regret to say that it will not be feasible to do so because of political considerations."

In October 1952, Crampton was again ordered to Bomber Command; he was told that the special-duty flight was being re-formed and was asked if he wanted to again be its commander. He accepted, and within a few days he was back at Sculthorpe, working with "Hack" Mixson and undergoing refresher training. There were a few crew changes; Sanders was back as his navigator, but Sargent Lindsay had been badly injured in a crash. His place as copilot was taken by flight lieutenant McAlistair Furze, one of the flight commanders with No. 101 Squadron. "MacFurze," as he was less formally known, quickly mastered the RB-45C systems, which pleased Crampton. He said later that Furze "would have elbowed me out of the captain's seat given half a chance." The other replacement was flight lieutenant Harry Currell, who took over as pilot from Bill Blair.

The special-duty flight trained through November 1952 and by early December was nearly ready for the overflights. The three routes were similar to those of the April overflights and were intended to get radarscope photos of long-range aviation airfields and other Soviet facilities. The missions were scheduled for the night of December 12 and 13, 1952. Only a few days before the overflights were to be made, however, they were abruptly called off. The special-duty flight was disbanded and its members were sent back to their original units. In a December 16, 1952, letter, air chief marshal Sir Hugh P Lloyd told Maj. Gen. John P McConnell: "I am only sorry that the operation ended the way it did - without the answers."

Why Ju Jitsu was so abruptly canceled was the subject of much rumor among the crews. Crampton recalled that among the rumors was the belief that the political risks of the overflight were too great - specifically, that if one of the RB-45Cs had gone down in the USSR, it might have triggered a war. Certainly, events in the fall of 1952 were heading in a dark and dangerous direction."