Metz, France

Ref – Operations Order 13/61 Check Mate

There were no peculiarities which materially affected the exercise. The operation followed closely the Roulette concept and provided realistic air defence training for 61 AC&W Squadron.

1. ECM: It was assumed that ECM would adversely affect operations throughout the exercise. However, the ECM experienced was limited to mechanical jamming and had little effect on operations at 61 AC&W Squadron. (One MI/ECM was recorded during the exercise).
2. Lane Control: It was assumed that the control capability code would advance to Phase III during the exercise. However, target saturation conditions were not experienced, and the control capability code did not exceed phase I.

Targets originated as synthetic tracks. However, this had no adverse effects on the execution of the exercise and considerable realism was affected from the profiles flown by the simulated aggressor.

Exercise plans were adequate for this unit. some annexes for the operation order arrived late at 61 AC&W Squadron preventing adequate study and thorough preparation prior to implementing the procedures.

Operation Manning and Scheduling: A two 12 hour shift system for the unit was put into effect at 110700Z and remained in effect until completion of the exercise. The Emergency Security Force personnel utilized 61 AC&W Squadron Personnel Shelter for sleeping quarters. The remaining personnel at 61 AC&W Squadron returned to their respective homes or barracks when off duty.

Security : The security for 61 AC&W Squadron was provided by the Emergency Security Force of Sector 3, augmented by operational and technical personnel from this unit. Guards were in position by 120610Z. Penetrations were attempted by intruders during the dark hours throughout the 3 days of the exercise. Intruders apparently had little difficulty in penetrating the outer perimeter fence but on all occasions their presence was detected by either guards or the two dogs that were used throughout the exercise. All intruders were apprehended before accomplishing their assigned mission. The only damage sustained was a simulated destruction of the Guard House van situated outside the fence, which in no way affected the operational capability of the unit.

Messing: Hot "C" rations were provided for full 24 hour operation.

Administration: The message centre and central registry operated 24 hours daily;

Transportation: Normal bus runs were maintained with no additional transportation being required during the exercise.

Shelter: It was planned to utilize the Salle de Machines and 61 AC&W Squadron bunkers for sheltering unit personnel. During this exercise the 61 AC&W Squadron Shelter only was used on a limited scale. Full shelter plans were not implemented as proper sleeping facilities are not available. Personnel of the Emergency Security Force did utilize temporary sleeping facilities in the form of stretchers set up in the 61 AC&W Squadron Personnel Shelter for the exercise.

Plot-Tell Communications: There were no outages on the plot – tell landlines which materially affected the exercise.

Weapon Assignment Officer (WAO) Communications: There were 7 outages on the WAO micro-wave circuit to Drachenbronn during the exercise. This unit has been advised that additional NATO funded landlines to Drachenbronn have recently been approved. These lines when installed should decrease, if not eliminate the outages that this unit is experiencing with the present micro-wave communications.

Tactical Action Reporting Line: There were 16 outages in the micro-wave tactical action reporting line from 61 AC&W Squadron to Drachenbronn for a total time out of 22 ½ hours. These outages delayed passage of mission results and caused overloading of re-routing facilities. As noted in para 13 a NATO funded landline has been approved for this purpose.

Air-Ground-Air Communications Serviceability of these facilities was excellent throughout the exercise and no outages were experienced.

Radar: The simultaneous failure of primary and back up radar for approximately 10 minutes resulted in 4 MI/GEF being recorded. There were no other unserviceabilities to radar equipment which materially affected the exercise. Two PPI failures resulted in the control capability of the unit being reduced from a total of 6 to 5 during the periods 131250Z to 131535Z and 141117Z to 121226Z.

Operations: Observations on the operational portion of the exercise are:

1. A total of 38 missed intercepts were recorded as tactical decisions and 37 missed intercepts recorded as faded prior to intercept. This large number of missed intercepts might more correctly be attributed to late commitment or late scramble.
2. In some cases South Sector committed fighters under 61 AC&W Squadron control to targets penetrating from the North that had been neutralized by North Sector. The targets after being neutralized by the North were not forward told to 61 AC&W Squadron preventing correlation.
3. Considerable overflying of the inner battle zone was required, with only assumed clearance, in order to accomplish successful missions.
4. Some targets were assigned which did not meet the target identification criteria for heading and altitude.
5. Mechanical ECM was experienced throughout the exercise but had little effect on operations.
6. 61 AC&W Squadron was required to relay information from the North Sector to 2 (F) Wing aircraft when these aircraft were operating out of other than their own Wing. This at times caused overloading and delays on existing lines between 61 AC&W Squadron and the Air Div Wings.

Weapons Assignment Officers (WAO): Numerous unserviceabilities to micro-wave communications between the WAO at 61 AC&W Squadron and the RCAF Assistant WAO at Drachenbronn adversely affected the operation of these positions. Re-routing of information over existing surveillance lines overloaded and slowed up the flow of surveillance information.

Surveillance: The air picture as received, correlated and displayed by 61 AC&W Squadron during the exercise was only fair. The main difficulties encountered were:

1. Difficulty in correlating targets due to lag between moves, personnel errors and language problems.
2. Target tracks bearing the same track numbers being received from both the North and South Sector did not correlate.
3. Some tracks designated as targets did not comply to the identification criteria of heading and altitude.

Weather Information: A current and excellent weather service was provided by the Wing Met Offices throughout the exercise. Only 5 Pireps were received and relayed by 61 AC&W Squadron. It may be that Pireps were passed by aircrew direct to towers. Aircrew may not be aware that 61 AC&W Squadron have the facilities to relay Pireps to the Wing Met Offices.

Intelligence: The intelligence information received prior to and during the exercise was considered excellent and should be continued in all future exercises of this type.

Personnel Play: 61 AC&W Squadron was advised during the exercise that certain of the unit’s personnel were simulated casualties. A question arose as the whether these personnel should be removed from the exercise. Due to the ramifications this would have in operations it was ruled that these personnel would remain in the exercise.

Nuclear Fallout: As with Personnel Play, 61 AC&W Squadron was advised it had experienced nuclear fallout and bomb damage. The question arose whether the unit should hand over aircraft and reduce operation in respect to damage and casualties declared. It was subsequently ruled that operations should be maintained.

Personnel Shelters: This was the first exercise in which the Personnel Shelter was used. Experience was gained which will prove beneficial for future use.

Personnel Losses and Bomb Damage: Clarification is required for future exercises whether operations will be affected due to simulated personnel losses and bomb damage.

ECM Training: Although mechanical ECM was used, more training value would be achieved if electronic ECM was introduced.

Operations: The following comments are made regarding operations during the exercise:

1. More use of the CAP tactic may have prevented some missed intercepts.
2. Operations could be made more efficient if targets were assigned to a GCI rather than a particular section of fighters. The GCI would be responsible for intercept of the target utilizing assigned aircraft that are in the best position.

(HC Vinnicombe) W/C
CO 61 AC&W Squadron